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Background: Human resources for health are self-evidently critical to running a health service and system. There is,
however, a wider set of social issues which is more rarely considered. One area which is hinted at in literature,
particularly on fragile and conflict-affected states, but rarely examined in detail, is the contribution which health
staff may or do play in relation to the wider state-building processes. This article aims to explore that relationship,
developing a conceptual framework to understand what linkages might exist and looking for empirical evidence in
the literature to support, refute or adapt those linkages.
Methods: An open call for contributions to the article was launched through an online community. The group
then developed a conceptual framework and explored a variety of literatures (political, economic, historical, public
administration, conflict and health-related) to find theoretical and empirical evidence related to the linkages outlined in
the framework. Three country case reports were also developed for Afghanistan, Burundi and Timor-Leste, using
secondary sources and the knowledge of the group.
Findings: We find that the empirical evidence for most of the linkages is not strong, which is not surprising, given
the complexity of the relationships. Nevertheless, some of the posited relationships are plausible, especially between
development of health cadres and a strengthened public administration, which in the long run underlies a number of
state-building features. The reintegration of factional health staff post-conflict is also plausibly linked to reconciliation
and peace-building. The role of medical staff as part of national elites may also be important.
Conclusions: The concept of state-building itself is highly contested, with a rich vein of scepticism about the
wisdom or feasibility of this as an external project. While recognizing the inherently political nature of these
processes, systems and sub-systems, it remains the case that state-building does occur over time, driven by a
combination of internal and external forces and that understanding the role played in it by the health system
and health staff, particularly after conflicts and in fragile settings, is an area worth further investigation. This
review and framework contribute to that debate.
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Human resources for health are self-evidently critical to
running a health service and system, and there has been
a small but growing literature on the returns to investing
in human resources for health (HRH) from the point of
view of health and associated economics gains [1]. There
is, however, a wider set of social issues which is more
rarely considered. Health systems have a social function,
and the individuals and institutions which make them
up play roles beyond preventing and curing ill health
and working to promote good health [2]. One area
which is hinted at in literature, particularly on fragile
and conflict-affected states, but rarely examined in
detail, is the contribution which health staff may or do
play in relation to the wider state-building processes.
This article aims to explore that relationship, develop-
ing a conceptual framework to understand what linkages
might exist and looking for empirical evidence in the lit-
erature to support, refute or adapt those linkages. This is
of importance as the state-building rationale is explicit
or implicit in many of the investment models of devel-
opment agencies [3], including for investments in HRH,
and merits better understanding in itself. We briefly
examine the concept of state-building and discuss the
elements which contribute to it. In this paper, we draw
on wider literature on the links between state-building
and human, institutional and economic development
and then examine evidence for different mechanisms
which might link HRH development with state-building,
drawing from fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS),
where the notion of state-building is most applicable.
Some challenges and enablers that can support or hin-
der the HRH elements of these linkages are highlighted.
In our concluding sections, we review the evidence for
the linkages and contributions of different disciplines
and communities to the discourse.
Methods
Composition of group
The authorship group was constituted in a participatory
way, following an open call made through the LinkedIn
Group on Health Systems in Fragile and Conflict-affected
States (FCAS) [4] in December 2014. The FCAS LinkedIn
group, which was set up in 2004 under the Health System
Global aegis, has over 300 members whose profiles sug-
gested theoretical and/or practical expertise and interest
in the topic. Out of this appeal, and through personal
networks, an authorship group was assembled which
included experiences of different FCAS settings and also
different disciplinary backgrounds. The group met virtu-
ally on several occasions in order to agree on the scope of
the article, discuss the research methods and compare
preliminary findings. Each group member was given a dif-
ferent area of literature to explore.Literature review
We recognized that state-building is an inherently polit-
ical concept and therefore we chose to explore studies
and literature from a wide variety of disciplinary per-
spectives. Our scoping of the literature explicitly looked
for themes in different bodies of literature, including
political sciences, economics, history, public administra-
tion and public health. The search was not systematic or
exhaustive but rather exploratory. Key words used in-
cluded the following: [health workforce, health workers,
human resources for health] AND [conflict, fragile
states, post-conflict] AND [state building, legitimacy,
equity, gender, peace, stability, intersectoral, public ad-
ministration, civil service, political settlement, discrim-
ination, neutrality, international aid, development, aid,
security, governance].
For the economics literature, the search was conducted
on JSTOR (Economics and Business journals), Econpapers,
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) web sites and
Econlit. With the exception of JSTOR, the query gave
few answers, and the research was extended to articles
containing the term “state-building” only. For histor-
ical research, the search was conducted on JSTOR
(history journals), giving 80 results that were all ana-
lysed. In addition to this, another research that only
included the keywords “state-building” and “human”
found 1 245 entries, of which the first 250 were ana-
lysed. Most of them proved irrelevant for the present
study.
The research done in political science on state-building
and related issues is vast. The approach chosen for this
study was to start with the reviews carried out by the
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
(GSDRC) in three topic guides [5-7]. These guides are
mostly aimed at development agencies and review “grey”
literature (such as agency-commissioned reports) more
than peer-reviewed publications. Based on the references
mentioned and a rapid internet search, further studies
were included.
For the conflict and fragile states literature, we fo-
cused on Conflict and Health and Disasters journals
and from there snowballed into references from pa-
pers. Grey literature was obtained from different web
sites such as WHO, MSH, MSF, CfBT Education Trust,
USAID, DFID, UNSW, World Bank and Humanitarian
Exchange. The public administration search was done
by starting with some key references and snowballing
from their reference sections.
Conceptual framework
Based on an initial discussion of the literature, a conceptual
framework was developed which was used to structure the
findings.
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In addition to probing the different bodies of literature,
three case reports were selected for a more in-depth
analysis. The aim of the case reports is to link the
themes more clearly with a concrete context and history.
Their choice was based on the areas of expertise of
group members. It is not a systematic sample, though
the cases do represent different scenarios and geograph-




The conceptual framework (Figure 1) starts with state-
building as an end-point. It was not a focus to probe the
concept of state-building in itself; however, it has to be
recognized that this is a disputed concept. Fukuyama [8]
defines state-building as the creation of new government
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones. He
argues that in building states it is important to consider
the scope and the strength of the state. The scope of the
state refers to the different areas in which the govern-
ment is able to produce policies and define interventions
while its strength is the ability to enforce these policies
or to implement these interventions successfully [9].
This is the broad approach used in this paper.
While state-building is often presented as a neutral
concept, others have pointed to the inherently political
nature of the project and to the fact that building of
states can mean reinforcement of oppressive regimes.
This includes the role that HRH (the subject of ourFigure 1 Conceptual framework.study) may play in this process. There is a great wealth
of historical literature on how colonial medicine and
health services, through the medical workforce, contrib-
uted to establishing unfair and coercive states [10,11].
Lyons [12] gives a particularly compelling example with
the case of “sleeping sickness” prevention in 1900–1940
Congo, which facilitated the building of the colonial
state. This example, which echoes other cases around
the world, highlights the fact that strengthened human
resources in health can also become, through the health
system they service, accomplices of the building of
oppressive states (to which they bring legitimacy).
Other critics have taken issue not so much with the
overall goal of state-building as with its realism, with
externally driven, short-term programmes unlikely to
create the robust institutions needed to “build” a state
[13]. They argue that there is limited evidence of the
efficacy of state-building and that indeed it may be
counterproductive, undermining the very social legitim-
acy it is intended to support [14,15]. This point is
echoed in empirical work by economists on modern
state-building (especially in relationship to aid) that un-
derlines the need for both iterative and localized solu-
tions to institution- and capacity-building [16] and the
fact that the “the macroeconomic framework [that aid
and donors bring in is] in general much too complex for
the available human resources” [17].
However, it should be noted that this critique is aimed
at external interventions, and in this paper, we take the
concept at its broadest, to include and indeed focus on
internally driven processes.
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Our framework identifies three core areas which are hy-
pothesized to contribute to state-building, which are (1)
capacity and willingness to provide core services to the
population, (2) legitimacy, and (3) providing security and
stability. These are broadly supported within the political
sciences and economics literature [18]. In particular,
Brinkerhoff [19] argues that “governance reconstruction”
in failed states and post-conflict societies is articulated
around three dimensions:
 Reconstructing legitimacy, i.e. “the acceptance of a
governing regime as correct, appropriate and/or
right”. Legitimacy does not consist only in
participation, inclusion, accountability and
contestability (elections) but also refers to delivering
services, which links to the “effectiveness” dimension
below. The ability to deliver social services is seen to
demonstrate government willingness and capacity to
respond to citizens’ needs and demands [19].
 Re-establishing security, which includes effective
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
(DDR) processes.
 Rebuilding effectiveness, which refers to the delivery
of core services (health, education, electricity, water
and sanitation, infrastructure, etc.) at the central
and sub-national levels. Economic governance is
also included here. This also recognized by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) [20], which argues that, in
turn, the integrity and effectiveness of the civil
service will influence the legitimacy of the state.
The link between the presence of civil servants
(including HRH) and legitimacy of the state therefore
runs in both ways, and while the presence of capable
civil servants is essential to ensure the functioning of
public administration and service provision, their
presence is unlikely in the total absence of state
legitimacy.
As the OECD argument on the linkage between effect-
iveness and legitimacy shows, these three dimensions
seem necessarily closely linked. This constitutes the base
of the “whole-of-government” approach that the OECD
and many donors are increasingly adopting in their inter-
vention in post-conflict and fragile settings, integrating de-
fence, diplomatic and development agencies [21-23]. The
donors’ literature generally identifies the same [24] or
similar three dimensions of state-building; the World
Development Report 2011, for example, stresses the ability
to provide security, justice and jobs [25], while the
Department for International Development (DFID) fo-
cuses on political settlement and processes, core functions
and expected functions [26].Other authors (see, for example, [27]) make a slightly
different analysis of state-building, differentiating be-
tween constitutive and outputs domains. Constitutive
domains include political settlement and regime, secur-
ity, rule of law, administrative governance; while output
domains include service delivery (health, education, util-
ities, etc.), justice system and processes and economic
governance. Similarly, Haider [7] makes an interesting
distinction between tangible and intangible aspects of
state-building. The first group includes actions such as
demobilizing soldiers, restoring infrastructure, building
institutions and providing services, while the second in-
cludes promoting positive state–society and intra-society
relations; restoring/generating trust in government, pub-
lic institutions and among citizens; and fostering socio-
political cohesion.
Based on this review of the theoretical literature on
state-building, we identify two possible pathways through
which the legitimacy of a state may be increased with
reference to HRH:
1. Provision of health services (of which HRH is a key
element) leading to increased state responsiveness to
citizens’ needs, which in turn increases legitimacy in
their eyes.
2. Presence of publicly employed HRH (civil servants)
leading to the presence of a legitimate and responsive
state, which increases trust and legitimacy of the
state.
In a sense, these pathways could be seen as pertaining,
respectively, to the tangible and the intangible aspects of
state-building described above.
State-building and human, institutional and economic
development
HRH development clearly intersects with state-building
via a wider web of human, institutional and economic
development. State-building per se is a relatively recent
concern for economists, who have, however, been inter-
ested in the role of institutions and human capital in
economic growth and development for a longer time
[28]. There is a well-established literature on the role of
what economists call human capital, often narrowly
understood as (formal/school) education, in generating
economic growth through innovation and gains in prod-
uctivity [29-31]. Economic surplus and growth are, in
turn, perceived as fundamental elements for the emer-
gence of states, which are deemed as resting on the
protection of productive economic interests (especially
security) in exchange for taxation [32]. Contrary to
post-war growth theories [33], recent neo-classical growth
theories argue that human rather than physical capital is
the lead engine of growth [34].
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influential work of Acemoglu and Robinson [35] tend
not to put human capital at the centre of (state) develop-
ment. “Good institutions”, which equates to inclusive
ones, matter much more than human capital and are
also not necessarily the product of higher human capital,
argue for instance Acemoglu et al. in [36]. Similarly, eco-
nomic historians such as Khan [37] challenge the main-
stream understanding of human capital, showing that in
the building of Western European states ad hoc “com-
monplace skills and entrepreneurial abilities to resolve
perceived problems” matter much more than formal and
deep technical knowledge.
Most theoretical and applied economists nonetheless
agree on the idea that support of human capital develop-
ment is one of the state’s key functions [38,39]. They as-
sume that strengthened human capital has positive
impacts on markets and growth, although this impact
may not always be visible in the short run. The latter, as
well as “weak constraints on the ruling group” and “pol-
itical instability”, lead theorists [38,40] to argue that
weak states have very little incentives for investing in
human capital and may develop human resources (and
other investments) “outside of state structures”.
On their side, historians advance the nature of the pol-
itical and professional elite as an explanatory factor for
state-building. Looking at the cases of Brazil and Chile,
de Carvalho [41] shows that a common ethos among the
elite as well as social and ideological homogeneity
favoured the consolidation of effective political power
and the building of these states outside of Spanish and
Portuguese rule. However, this homogeneity can quickly
lead to a dead end as power is not being redistributed.
This is also the point of Waldner [42], who looks at
successful development stories in the 20th century and
identifies broad coalitions of the existing human re-
sources as necessary for sustainable development. The
importance of the civil servants’ ethos and ideology in
the building of the state is highlighted by many other
authors, including Anderson [43] who works on early
modern Germany. It is more generally reflected in the
distinction between nation- and state-building (the latter
is stripped of the ideological dimension).
This leads to the case of the “illiberal state-building” of
Angola, where the elite is invoking, among others, the
lack of human resources to justify a different state-
building “in defiance of liberal peace precepts on civil
liberties, the rule of law, the expansion of economic
freedoms and poverty alleviation” [44]. De Oliveira, in
company with most historians and economists, is doubt-
ful of the real commitment of predatory elites to human
resource development.
The connection between the civil service and the citi-
zens is identified by historians, such as Olowu [45], as akey factor for effective state-building as it should enable
adequate goods, services and efficient markets. Looking
at the argument the other way round, he highlights that
“the disconnection between the state and society is one
of the fundamental causes of the crisis of the African
state and its civil service systems”.
Linkages between HRH and the state-building
nodes
Institutional capacity for health workforce governance
In FCAS, governments struggle to mobilize, manage and
distribute health resources. Often, health care is deliv-
ered either through public health services or by con-
tracting out to third parties (e.g. NGOs). For example, in
post-conflict Sierra Leone, health services were provided
through public facilities [46], while in Afghanistan [47]
and initially in Timor-Leste [48] NGOs were contracted
to provide health services to the population (see Tables 1
and 2). Sometimes, particularly during the early stages f
post-conflict, NGOs deliver services in areas where se-
curity is still volatile while government covers urban and
more secure areas. This is, for example, the case of
South Sudan where NGOs were reported to deliver 84%
of health care services, while government took responsi-
bility for the other 16% [49].
While delivering services through third parties is sug-
gested to undermine a government’s legitimacy by some
authors [50], others maintain that whether there is a loss
of legitimacy or not depends on the role that the state
plays on coordinating the work of NGOs or other
private providers. In Afghanistan, the MoPH developed
national health workforce policies including HR manage-
ment systems. However, as capacity for health service
delivery is still limited, the MoPH signed contracts with
NGOs allocated to provinces, and NGOs are bound by a
formal contract to deliver a Basic Package of Health
Services (BPHS) at the provincial level [51]. This shows
some control over the NGOs’ work by the MoPH [2]. A
similar strategy was used in Cambodia [52]. In both
cases, the state retains its stewardship role and is seen as
responsible for the provision of services; therefore, its le-
gitimacy should not be affected. In Timor-Leste, the
European Union shifted from funding NGOs directly to
funding them via the government, allowing the Ministry
of Health (MoH) to sign contracts with NGOs detailing a
list of services that they had to deliver at the district
level [53]. As security improved and the transitional
government was in place, in 2001, the government took
over the management of health services and staff from
NGOs, while requesting NGOs to continue providing
technical and logistical support. How much each different
strategy (e.g. direct public provision or commissioning/
contracting out) contributes to improve the legitimacy of
the emerging government is again difficult to ascertain,
Table 1 Afghanistan case report
Theme Findings
Background In 1978, the former Soviet Union military invaded Afghanistan, leading to chronic conflict, insecurity and instability in
Afghanistan. The communist regime remained in power until 1992, and during the 13 years of its ruling, it contributed
little to the welfare of the people. After taking power in 1992, a coalition of Mujahedeen factions brought Afghanistan
into a new time of conflict, civil war and inter-Mujahedeen fighting. The Taliban ruled the country from 1996 to November
2001. The Taliban showed little interest in the health sector [73]. In December 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed and a
new democratic government was established. In 2002, the level of health services was shocking. Lack of a policy framework,
inequalities in health service provision across the country, low capacity of public and private sectors, differences in the quality
of the services, the absence of infrastructure, lack of coordination and shortage of health human resources were some of the
main challenges [74].
Institutional capacity After the establishment of the new government, the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) at
the central level has been strengthened with the provision of training programmes and the hiring of a number of
local consultants. Regulatory documents and guidelines to support the hiring and management of HR have been
put in place in collaboration with the Civil Service Commission. Despite these efforts at the central level, at the
decentralized level, the state capacity to provide services is still weak. Scholars working on public administration and
civil service (beyond the health sector) in Afghanistan have highlighted the gap between the formal and informal
institutions. The limited reach that the de jure state has in the provinces leaves room for a de facto authority structure
of warlords, with commanders filling in the state functions and weakening its legitimacy [75].
Intersectoral coordination Intersectoral collaboration has been reinforced by increasing coordination and dividing tasks between different
institutions within the public administration so that the Civil Service Commission hires top grade officers (general
directors and directors), while the MoPH is responsible for hiring all other officers. However, the institutional capacity is not
at optimal level. Moreover, the financial capacity of the government to pay its officials remains limited. Most of the staff in
key positions of the MoPH, while officially employed by the government, receive a salary or a salary supplementation from
external organizations and development projects. Although work has been done to attempt to align and harmonize pay,
disparities in remuneration still exist, which are a cause of demotivation for health workers (HWs) [76,77].
Adequacy and coverage
of HRH
In contrast to other services provided by the public administration, health service delivery at the decentralized level
has been contracted out to NGOs [60]. In terms of the presence of funded, effective and responsive HRH, NGOs hire
health workers directly. In 2003, the MoPH developed a national salary policy to standardize HWs’ remuneration across
the country and compensate particularly female HWs for assuming posts in rural and underserved areas [78]. The remoter
the HWs, the higher the salaries they receive. However, due to the lack of health care workers, especially of higher cadres,
in rural areas and the high security risks, disparity in health provision and inadequate HRH compared to the population
needs is noticeable. The most recent HRH Strategy points to gender imbalances as well as disparities in urban/rural
distribution of HWs—for example, there are 16.7 public health workers per 10 000 (including unqualified support
staff) in rural areas, compared with 36 per 10 000 in urban areas [76]. These issues may contribute to the problems
that characterize the health system and the weak public health care provision. Evidence at household level suggests
limited utilization of (NGO-provided) public health services, perceptions that these offer inferior quality and a
preference for private providers [79].
Integration fo HRH While official regulations do not allow for discrimination in provision of employment, in practice, it is difficult to ensure
a non-discriminatory environment and transparency of hiring practices. Political and tribal pressures exist, and favouritism
and nepotism are common when hiring new staff, particularly in key positions, also at the central level [77]. It has been
noted that the preferential support of donors for discrete health programmes and the establishment of parallel
management systems outside the MoPH, rather than broader institutional support to the MoPH, including to
anti-corruption and transparency programmes, may hamper the progress made on these issues, which are
essential for the improvement of the public health sector [77].
Reinforcement of the public civil service for the provision of health care services seems to be following two tracks. At
the central level, the presence of a cadre of professionals that are well-trained and relatively well-paid (with external
salary supplements) seems to be playing a role in contributing to the state-building process (despite some persistent
difficulties). At the local/decentralized level, however, improvements in the availability, distribution and adequacy of
HRH seems to be hampered by insecurity so that the strengthening of HRH (and health service provision) appears to
rest on state-building rather than contributing to it.
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type of service provision with state legitimacy.
Equitable availability of HRH
The training and deployment of community health
workers (CHWs) is often chosen as a means to ensure
service provision in remote areas, which in turn is
hypothesized to show willingness of the emerging
government to provide services for all, hence contributing
to state-building. It is reported that the introduction of
teams of CHWs increased access to antiretroviral therapyin remote areas of Mozambique [54]. Similarly, in
Afghanistan, CHWs—more than half of whom are
women [55]—arguably contributed to strengthen the
health system by expanding accessibility to TB and ma-
ternal, neonatal and child health (MNCH) services
[56]. In Pakistan, the Lady Health Workers programme
also reportedly improved access to and utilization of
MNCH services [57]. The fact that these CHWs con-
tributed to increased acceptability of health services
may have promoted the image of the government as
willing to provide services to their constituencies.
Table 2 Timor-Leste case report
Theme Findings
Background Timor-Leste achieved its independence in 2002 after 450 years of Portuguese colonization and 24
of Indonesian occupation. Following the vote for Independence in August 1999, an Australian-led
multinational force was deployed to stop the violence and destruction triggered by the results [80].
A UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) was established in October 1999. The country’s health
system faced serious problems due to destruction of infrastructure and severe health workforce
deficiencies as skilled health workers and managers fled the country [48,53]. NGOs were the
main health service providers during the emergency period from 1999 to 2001. A Trust Fund for
East Timor (TFET) administered by the World Bank was created in early 2000 [53]. Timor-Leste
faced a relapse of violence in 2006, and a UN mission (UNMIT) was deployed. In preparation for
its withdrawal in 2012, the country developed a transition plan in 2011 to move from
peacekeeping “…to the new phase of state building” [81].
Institutional capacity Weak institutional capacity was part of the legacy left by Indonesia after withdrawal in 1999. During
the Indonesian occupation, most middle and top managerial positions in the government, including
the health sector, were held by non-Timorese Indonesians [82]. Around 7 000 civil servants fled
the country after Indonesia’s withdrawal [83]. In the health sector, destruction of health facilities
and institutions, including destruction of records, left severely weakened institutions. UNTAET
and the first National Government had as a priority to develop individual and institutional
capacity. In the health sector, training of district managers and senior officers working at MoH level
was prioritized and undertaken as early as 2001 and 2002 [51]. This allowed, for instance, for the
assumption of responsibility over district health management by the government. However,
there was a sense of scepticism about this decision among NGOs and development partners
who thought there was not enough capacity built yet to ensure an efficient health service
provision [48] which speaks about the limited international legitimacy of the emerging
government. Soon after the initial emergency phase, strengthening educational institutions for
health professions was prioritized. Establishment of a Faculty of Medicine in 2005 and schools
of Nursing and Midwifery in 2008 allowed for local production of these key cadres. This contributed
to a relatively more sustainable workforce than in other small countries in the region which still
depend on international recruitment and on sending students abroad.
Intersectoral coordination The Timor-Leste Ministry of Health’s vision implies a broad definition of health which involves
social determinants of health [84]. This approach requires intersectoral collaboration. The Strategic
Development Plan 2011–2030 recognizes that in order to address health problems an intersectoral
approach is required and that coordination with other sectors such as agriculture, environment or
infrastructures is paramount [85]. However, the implementation remains a challenge due to HR
and institutional capacity limitations [86].
Adequacy and coverage of HRH Deployment of skilled health professionals to remote areas as part of the government’s policy to
staff each facility with one doctor, two nurses and two midwives in every village is currently
ongoing. However, while deployment of physicians is already achieving 76% of the target (335
of 442 TL’s villages), appointment of nurses and midwives is proving more difficult mainly due to
the more limited production of these professionalsa.
MNCH indicators in Timor-Leste are still poor. Access to MNCH service in remote areas is limited
mainly due to shortage of adequate HRH. In order to address this issue, Timor-Leste is currently
supporting nurses with rural backgrounds to undertake training in midwifery to ensure their
deployment and retention in these remote locations [87]. During the pre-Independence period,
assistance during delivery in Timor-Leste was usually provided by traditional birth attendants
(TBAs), partially due to the mistrust of the population on the Indonesian health services. Ribeiro
Sarmento [88] found that the integration of TBAs in the public health workforce as family health
promoters contributes to increase access to these essential services to population living in
remote areas hence contributing to increase equity in health service delivery.
Only 31 doctors remained in Timor-Leste after the withdrawal of Indonesia [58]. The government
of Timor-Leste signed a bilateral agreement with Cuba in April 2004 to deploy between 150 and
200 doctors to provide clinical services and to train 1 000 Timorese doctors [89]. As a result, 838
medical doctors graduated between 2010 and 2014 and are now being deployed across the
country including remote areas [90].
Presence of funded, effective and responsive
public servants and CHWs following public
goals
Weak institutional capacity within the transitional administration was reflected in the slow pace
of the process of recruitment of civil servants in 2001, which is reported to have undermined the
credibility of the newly established Civil Service [53]. However, initiatives like the reorientation and
integration of TBAs within the national workforce and the scaling up of the midwifery workforce
mentioned above are contributing to improve the availability of services provided by these key
professionals.
Integration of HRH: the role of HRH in the
2006 political instability
After some years of peace, political instability caused widespread communal violence in 2006,
leading to the displacement of approximately 150 000 people. The conflict deepened the division
in the Timorese community between “East—Lorosa’e” and “West—Loromonu”. Timorese health
workers belonging to both sides of this divide played a commendable role avoiding being dragged
into this division and continuing to work maintaining their neutrality and impartiality and providing
health care to people from East and West without discrimination. Cuban doctors and NGO staff
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Table 2 Timor-Leste case report (Continued)
played also an important role. Strong leadership by the Minister of Health, communication and
effective coordination are among the factors identified that kept staff morale to continue working
in such an unstable environment [90]. This contributed to promote a sense of resilience among the
people living in IDP camps and the general population who was able to access health services
during the crisis without disruption. This is likely to have contributed to increase the government’s
legitimacy. Dr. Araujo, former Minister of Health and regarded as the leader of the health system
rehabilitation, has been recently sworn in as the 5th Prime Minister. This shows the key role that
health professionals, thanks to their social legitimacy, can play not only in reconstructing health
systems after conflict but also in assuming leadership roles and contributing to national
reconstruction and state-building.
aPersonal communication with the Director of the Human Resource Department of the Ministry of Health Timor-Leste.
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programme was attributed to the support received
from the Prime Minister, who strongly promoted this
strategy, which demonstrates the possible two-way
links between politics and HRH investments. Whether
CHWs are integrated in the national workforce with a
specific role or contracted by NGOs and therefore
working more independently may influence their im-
pact on state-building.
During early post-conflict interventions, donors and
governments often need to show quick results, and pri-
orities may follow externally driven political objectives
rather than health needs. Priority is then given to the re-
habilitation of the more visible physical infrastructures,
such as tertiary hospitals, and peripheral structures that
serve people who have less access to health care and
often greater health needs are neglected. Similarly, in
HRH, priority for rehabilitation of the different cadres
may not be guided by equity concerns: the medical
workforce is sometimes prioritized above the nursing
workforce, despite the fact that nurses are the main pro-
viders of basic services, particularly in more deprived
areas where the population most in need lives [58]. For
example, in Cambodia, nurses and midwives trained be-
fore the war were retrained as doctors. This took the ex-
perienced HWs of these cadres away from their original
professions, causing an over-production of doctors and
medical assistants. Moreover, pressures were in place to
abandon training of assistant-level nurses and midwives
in favour of training diploma nurses, who often then
ended up working in the private sectora.
Periods of post-conflict are often said to open windows
of opportunity to improve the efficiency of existing insti-
tutions as resistance from politicians and civil servants is
often less intense than during periods of stability. In
Timor-Leste, an inflated nursing workforce during the
Indonesian times was reduced from more than 3 000 to
1 400 after the conflict [53]. In Mozambique, the MoH
removed around 2 000 ghost workers from the payroll in
the early 2000s [55]. Pavignani and Colombo suggest
that the reconstruction process represents a unique op-
portunity to improve equity in human resources withinthe health system [59]. The precise timing of this
window of opportunity can vary; a study of HRH policy
in Sierra Leone found that the window for reform
opened not in the immediate post-conflict period, when
capacity and authority were still limited, but after some
years, when government and donor commitment coa-
lesced around reforms linked to the Free Health Care
Initiative [46].
Despite these examples, it has been shown, however,
that in many countries affected by conflict the govern-
ment is often not able to provide health services. There-
fore, networks of formal and informal health workers
with different backgrounds and skills emerge to provide
different services demanded by the population [60], in-
cluding training [55].
HRH reintegration and inclusiveness
The reintegration of “civil service personnel” of opposing
factions may play a relatively important role in reconcili-
ation and peace-building. In a review of the DDR
process of Ethiopia, Colletta et al. [61] find that, among
all the activities carried out to reintegrate ex-fighters,
only HWs have a special status (1 400 ex-combatant
health workers were employed by the MoH at the end of
the conflict). In Sierra Leone, there are descriptions of
how a polio campaign and EPI vaccinations became an
entry point for the negotiations with the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) rebels towards the end of the con-
flict in 2000–2001 for the delivery of health services be-
hind rebel lines. In terms of HRH, “training and
implementation of the exercise had a 60% RUF, 40%
MOHS personnel” [62] and it was key to involve local
(qualified and unqualified) personnel from the commu-
nities. The “combat medics” who were providing services
for the RUF and for the population behind rebels’ lines
had little or no formal qualification. Initially, they were in-
cluded in the campaigns only for the social mobilization
aspects. However, the “combat medics” themselves later
demanded to be included as vaccinators and were eventu-
ally trained by the District Health Management Team
(DHMT). Later on, they were mostly employed to carry
out vaccinations in the border areas between Sierra Leone
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between DHMT/government HWs and RUF combat
medics is often stressed as one of the keys of the success
of the campaign and the subsequent beginning of MoH
provision of health services in the Kailahun districtb. At
least in the informant’s experience, deployment of HWs
hired and paid by the MoH in all districts, reintegration
and training of “HWs” (including the unqualified ones)
formerly working with the rebels and local recruitment all
played a key role in reinforcing and entrenching the health
systems in rebel-affected areas.
Balladelli et al. [63] suggest that investment in address-
ing integration of military health workers requires sub-
stantial political and financial efforts but that it is greatly
justified. In Angola, more than 1 500 UNITA health
workers were reintegrated in the national health service
workforce after the conflict. The positive experience was
then extended to around 7 500 civilian health workers
who worked in areas dominated by UNITA during the
conflict [63]. In Mozambique, reintegration of HRHs
who worked in areas dominated by RENAMO within
the new health system helped in dissipating tensions and
contributed to the “good image” of the emerging govern-
ment [59]. However, there is no empirical evidence
about the causal relation or the contribution of the
reintegration on improving the legitimacy of the new
government or its overall contribution to state-building.
It is also to be noted that 20 years after the conflict in
Mozambique the divide between the government and
the rebels is still wide, and the civil service remains loyal
to the ruling party. There are other examples where this
integration did not take place. The ratio of Hutu senior
government officials per Hutu population in the Rwan-
dan civil service 15 years after the conflict was 1 per 500
000 Hutus while the proportion of Tutsi senior public
servants was 1 per 70 000 Tutsis [64].
Although humanitarian workers are important actors
in post-conflict settings, it is hard to measure the impact
of their interventions on state-building in fragile areas.
The role of NGOs often goes beyond the mere delivery
of services; it also includes other elements such as the
witnessing of human rights abuses by health professionals
[65]. There are many positive examples of these interven-
tions, such as humanitarian ceasefires for immunization
campaigns in El Salvador or transport of medical supplies
in Uganda and Sudan [66]. The provision of health care
can be a common ground for collaboration between
health professionals from opponent parties, which in turn
can contribute to community reconciliation. Continuity in
the delivery of health services during relapses of violence
after conflict may be perceived positively by a popula-
tion already traumatized by the recent conflict. In
Timor-Leste, the behaviour of the health workforce dur-
ing the relapse of violence in 2006, which continuedproviding services despite the turmoil, was reported to
have provided a sense of resilience and continuity
within the chaos [67]. This particular case demonstrated
that health workers were impartial during the conflict
and were able to fulfil their professional ethics in times
of instability, but this may be an exceptional case rather
than the norm.
Enablers and challenges
In the framework proposed, we also identified a series of
enabling factors and potential challenges which could
strengthen or hinder the linkages between HRH and
state-building processes, and we explored the related
literature, although not systematically. Many of the con-
cerns (indeed, more challenges than enablers emerge)
come from donor-oriented literature. It focuses on lessons
for external partners, including the long-term approach
which is needed to support successful bureaucratic re-
forms, a time span which does not fit with the length of
typical projects [68]. The need to trade-off short-term
goals (re-establishing service delivery) against long-term
ones (capacity-building) is also highlighted by a number of
authors, such as Fukuyama [8]. Timor-Leste, however, in
reconstructing the civil service after the conflict, priori-
tized capacity-building on general and financial manage-
ment as a means to strengthen policy implementation. In
the early stages of the health sector rehabilitation, priority
was given to train mid-level managers (e.g. DHMTs) in
order to ensure an efficient management of the newly re-
cruited civil service [53]. As a result, responsibility for
health services management was swiftly transferred from
international NGOs to government at a relatively early
stage in the reconstruction process with no impact on the
positive trend of health service delivery output indicators
[48]. Another important lesson is that reforming human
resource management and development practices is an
inherently political process—a fact that donors ignore at
their peril [68]. The need for leadership development,
adequate remuneration [69], harmonization with wider
public administration reforms and developing capacity to
manage relationships with non-state actors are also
emphasized.
Discussion
We have found that there is a substantial body of evi-
dence on state-building and its constituent parts, largely
drawn from political and historical sources. From a his-
torical perspective, the process is often associated with
an accumulation of capital, centralization and control
over the means of coercion and the enhanced power of
rulers to access these resources by appearing to be legit-
imate [15]. When the term is used by development agen-
cies, it clearly has different connotations, being used in a
politically neutral and more sanitized manner, to mean
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some critique of the concept of externally engineered
state-building, both in development and economics litera-
ture. In this paper, we have considered the relationship,
theoretical and empirical, between human resources for
health development and state-building, understood as the
(largely internally driven) processes whereby the capacity,
legitimacy and ability to provide security of a state are
enhanced.
A strand of the literature has analysed the relationship
between health sector development or health system
strengthening as a whole and state-building focused on
fragile and conflict-affected countries. Kruk et al. [2], for
example, identified strengthening state institutions and
legitimacy as the basis for establishing a resilient state
after conflict, while the legitimacy of the new govern-
ment in Mozambique after the conflict is reported to
have been strengthened by its focus on the rehabilitation
of primary health care services in rural areas [59]. How-
ever, much of the literature is theoretical or normative,
setting out expected and hoped-for relationships. There
is very limited empirical evidence, which is not surpris-
ing, given the sometimes intangible nature and difficulty
of assessment of state- and institution-building. Where
evidence exists, as in Mozambique, the causality is
unclear and can be assumed to run both ways—greater
legitimacy allows the government to develop primary
health care (PHC) services as much as better PHC
services contribute to legitimacy.
There has been no review to date, to our knowledge,
of the specific contributions of human resources for
health to state-building. We started by outlining some
possible linkages. One is through institutional capacity
development to employ and manage staff, directly or in-
directly through contracts with third parties. This is dis-
cussed in public administration, political and development
literature. Within public administration, perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the restoration and strengthening of the civil ser-
vice is seen as the backbone of state-building—supporting
all of the core nodal areas, such as delivery of services, in-
creased legitimacy, intersectoral coordination and reinte-
gration of staff. The focus of the literature is on the
measures needed, and the relationship with state-building
is largely (and some might say reasonably) assumed.
Managing relationships with non-state actors has pro-
voked a large and ideologically divided literature. On
one side, state-building evidently focuses on the capacity
of the public bodies to either deliver services or to man-
age their delivery effectively. In FCAS, however, the cap-
acity to do either is often lacking, and supporting service
delivery by third parties, often international NGOs, has
been contentious in terms of its long-term legacy. In
some cases, such as Afghanistan, staff are not hired dir-
ectly by government, and in others, such as Timor-Leste,NGOs initially hired staff directly but soon switched to
working alongside government hired and managed
personnel. The latter model is seen as having developed
government capacity, but the familiar chicken-and-egg
problem arises. More fundamentally, some oppose the
statist focus and highlight the contributions of a wide
range of formal and informal providers to the resilience
of the health care market, particularly in FCAS. State-
building in this context is seen as ignoring or potentially
threatening the often important role these actors play.
There is a growing literature within health and conflict
writings about the importance of supporting adequately
trained, supported, distributed and managed staff in
FCAS and how this may be achieved, but the links with
the state-building are not explicit. Economic literature,
however, identifies some elements within “human capital
development” which contribute to economic develop-
ment, which in turn is affected by and affects state
development.
More clearly connected are the cases of reintegration
of staff from different factions, post-conflict, which not
only establish services which are nationwide but also send
clear messages of reconciliation and non-discrimination.
Positive anecdotal evidence comes from a range of coun-
tries, including Sierra Leone, Angola and Mozambique,
though there are also examples of countries where this
has been hard to achieve (such as in some of the Balkan
states post-conflict).
Much of the literature identified is aimed at develop-
ment agencies and has a pragmatic orientation towards
lessons learned, without taking on board some of the
broader political and historical aspects, which come
from the wider (non-commissioned) studies. The latter
literature, of whatever disciplinary background, has a
more sceptical approach, particularly to externally driven
state-building. The risk of linking success indicators for
projects to something as intangible and hard to measure
as “increased legitimacy” and other state-building “out-
puts” is rightly highlighted [70].
More plausible in the long run is the contribution of
HRH to the development of professional associations
and public service institutions, which ultimately build
capacity, legitimacy and security, as well as contributing to
the economic growth which underlies these. Historical
analysis is best suited to unpicking these relationships,
though always open to (re)interpretation.
None of the relationships are simple, mechanical, one-
directional or static, however. As highlighted in the
framework, history demonstrates virtuous as well as vi-
cious circles. Power and institutions can be used oppres-
sively, corruptly and to deepen inequalities. De jure and
de facto relationships differ, and local and national sys-
tems can be very divergent, as illustrated by the Afghan
case report. As medical staff often represent an elite
Table 3 Burundi case report
Theme Findings
Background The post-colonial history of Burundi is affected by long periods of autocratic rule (1962–1992),
mass killings (1972, 1988, 1993) and a protracted civil war that started in 1993 and only
definitely ceased in 2008. Democracy, the outcome of the liberal peace that gradually
started with the Arusha Peace agreements in 2000, is still fragile, and the recent years
have seen continuous political violence and the control of the political and economic
power by a small group of people coming from the ranks of the former main rebel
movement CNDD-FDD. Burundi remains a very obvious case of a FCAS. The country ranks
at the very bottom of most rankings on health, human development and governance.
The war left the health sector in ruins [91]: in the early 2000s, as peace was returning, the
WHO estimated that the country had only 2 nurses per 10 000 inhabitants. The last
available figure from 2009 is 19 nurses per 10 000 inhabitants.
Institutional capacity As a 2011 MoH report points out, information on the management of the health workforce
at district and health facility levels is still lacking. The WHO-sponsored National Observatory
of Human Resources set up in 2012 may help improve the situation by gathering intelligence
on HRH and strengthening institutional capacity to manage them. However, in general, public
servants’ positions and tasks within the MoH and at the peripheral level are still often not
clearly defined in job descriptions [92]. Laws have been passed (notably the 2010 HRH
Development Policy) and frameworks have been designed to improve the management of
human resources, but in the field, difficulties remain [93]. In 2006, at the same time when user
fees were removed for pregnant mothers and children under five, international NGOs started
implementing performance-based financing (PBF) mechanisms in order to respond to the
challenges of responsiveness and effectiveness of the public servants. PBF has also boosted
the regularity of nurses’ payment and their mean income, which now approximates US$
350–400/month (for a qualified nurse). Yet, PBF has not tackled the issue of the actual salaries
remaining low. Overall, PBF and international aid may have augmented the institutional
capacity of the MoH, hence possibly contributing to improving service delivery, but have
also introduced a degree of complexity that may not be manageable without aid support.
Official documents show that the MoH relies heavily on PBF to sort out human resource
issues, ranging from incentivization and payment to general management [93].
Effective intersectoral coordination Until 2010, there existed a Ministry of HIV/AIDS alongside with the Ministry of Health—and
the lack of coordination between the two ministers was notorious. The divide of ministries
between political parties and “ethnic” groups, with the Ministry of Health not necessarily
always falling in the camp of the main political party, also contributed to hampering
coordination until around 2010 when the CNDD-FDD established a firmer control over the
MoH. Formal mechanisms of coordination remain primarily aid-led. They also suffer from
the reluctance of the health sector to collaborate with other sectors that did not move as
fast as it did after the war. Indeed, the MoH had a clear advantage over other ministries as
(1) it did not face the same challenges of reintegration of part of the workforce as other
sectors (see below) and (2) could count on a well-identified workforce whose work was
not very different from past regimes. In the recent years, the presidency has established a
stronger grip on health issues, but often, decisions are taken without consultation with or
agreement of the MoH staff. A very clear example is the introduction of a new insurance
scheme in 2013 that many in the MoH viewed as badly designed but was forced by the
presidency. The coordination of the different actors, including non-state, involved in HRH
management still remains a weakness of the health system [93] and maintains Burundi as
an aid-dependant state.
Presence of funded, effective and responsive
public servants and CHWs following public goals
Although until recently the Community Health Workers have been largely left out of the
PBF scheme [94], PBF has provided a new source of revenue to the medical staff and has
possibly increased their responsiveness to the population needs in terms of maternal
and child health care [95,96]. The definition of (paid) indicators has also provided clear
incentives for the public servants to align with the priorities defined by the MoH. As long
as the PBF functions and leads to (even small) improvements in service delivery, it could
reinforce the state, but the risk is that this elaborate scheme, which still rests on international
money and support [96], eventually crumbles. As of 2014, less than 1% of the MoH staff had
had training on human resources management, and the lack of clear terms of reference for
positions may put at risk the good accomplishment of public goals
Adequacy and coverage of HRH This is perhaps the area in which most progress has been made and where the linkage
with state-building is the most obvious, although the causality is probably going both
ways. The Tutsi autocratic rule and the 1972 mass killings [97], which targeted educated
Hutus, led to a clear imbalance in human resources in health (especially at the highest
levels of qualification). The discrepancy in service provision has been well-documented,
with the province of Bururi, home province of the dictators, being clearly favoured [98].
Post-conflict strategies for human resources in health did try to balance this out, and the
change of political power (to the hands of Hutu northerners) also changed the geographical
focus of patrimonial flows. The imbalance still partly remains, though, with most resources
per inhabitant still concentrated in the west of the country, but it is probably less than
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before [99]. In the long run, it is, however, unclear whether the true beneficiary of this change
is the Burundian state or the ruling party (or both). A recent report on health facilities [99]
finds that human resources are still too centralized.
Integration of HRH During the civil war, most of the health facilities remained, officially, under MoH control,
and the state was, with support from international aid, the main provider of health services.
At the local level, the post-conflict integration of human resources was much less of a
problem in health than in other sectors. At the central level, the ruling party eventually
took control of the MoH. There is recent anecdotal evidence of a ruling party-induced
politicization of HRH down to the level of health centres’ chief nurses (with chief nurses
being asked to join to the party), which may have unclear effects on state-building. At
the same time, the wider opening of medical training has certainly contributed to creating
a medical workforce that better reflects and integrates the political, “ethnic” and social
cleavages of Burundian society. There was only 1 private paramedical school in 2007
after the war, and 4 years later, there are 13. However, some reports and official documents
have seriously questioned the quality and adequacy of the training provided by the newly
created schools of nursing and medicine [92]. The quality control of the sector tends to be
loose.
International context Burundi has benefited from massive international aid, which still constitutes over half of
its planned budget (43% in the 2010–2015 PNDS). As in other countries, humanitarian aid
and the early phases of development aid took a toll on the few existing human resources
(that were diverted from the public sectors to aid organizations). The phenomenon has
not stopped with the country officially coming out of the humanitarian phase, although,
fortunately, the total number of nurses and doctors has increased. As Dinnen [72] noted in a
different case, the positive aspect of international involvement is an improvement of service
delivery, but it comes at the cost of a protracted dependency to aid which may be detrimental
to state-building. In the past years, autocratic decisions of the government, political intimidation
and abuse of human rights have pushed donors to withhold part of their support, putting the
country on the verge of bankruptcy and triggering more instability [100].
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their training to political office [71], they may have an
influence (positive or negative) beyond other public ser-
vants. There are also trade-offs to be managed. Looking
at the case of state-building in the Solomon islands from
a long-run perspective, Dinnen [72] finds that “the
capacity-building paradox is that the more substantial
the intervention is in terms of external resources and
personnel, the greater the risk that it ends up ‘sucking
out’ local capacity rather than building it”. In his view,
both capacity-building (HR strengthening) and service
delivery are essential for state-building, but they are
often antagonistic, and there is, ultimately, a trade-off
between quickly restoring service delivery on the one
hand and building capacities on the other.
The literature (especially studies which are not written
for donor agencies) suggests that we should be cautious
about intervening externally in order to “build states”
through HRH development as well as well as other
channels. The complexity of local dynamics is such that
the risks of unintended negative consequences are high.
Targeting more tangible outputs, such as improved ser-
vice coverage, is advisable. Even here there are risks and
trade-offs, of course. The example of the PBF system in
Burundi (see Table 3) highlights that there is no magic
bullet (in this case, the issue of sustainability rapidly
arise).
Ultimately, health, health care and health care workers
are all subject to political considerations. The literatureon reintegration of staff from different factions, on
disease control as a “neutral entry point” and on health
as a “bridge to peace” all highlight the fact that health
can be used to promote stability and reconciliation but
can also be manipulated or “weaponized”. The local pol-
itical economy is all-important. The Burundi case report,
for example, illustrates that increasing numbers of health
workers may be easier (in the local political economy)
than reorganizing the workforce and dealing with a top-
heavy bureaucracy, while party control over a ministry
may be key to its influence.
This paper has a number of important limitations. It is
based on an exploratory review of the literature only and
may have missed some important studies. In addition,
the case reports are limited and do not represent the full
range of experiences. Finally, we selected a number of
disciplinary areas to investigate, which are not exhaust-
ive. Given that the topic cuts across a number of bound-
aries, the search could have been almost endless.
However, on the positive side, the attempt to draw from
different bodies of literature has been very illuminating.
The discourses clearly vary, and the bodies of literature
focus on different parts of the conceptual framework.
While the literature on HRH and health systems focuses
on pragmatic issues and makes limited assumptions
about wider impacts, public administration is more
normatively aligned with institution-building and the
“middle zone” of the framework, as is economics, with
its probing of state–economy relations and underlying
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side of the conceptual framework—on conflict, power
and states, though with a less naive view of how they are
built, compared to some of the development literature.
Adding the longer term perspective of history also helps
to understand patterns which are not obvious to more
short-term studies, although these patterns are still sub-
ject to interpretative differences.
Conclusion
This paper, based on an exploratory literature review
and the experience of the author group, has developed a
conceptual framework for understanding how human re-
sources for health could contribute to state-building. It
has found that the empirical evidence for most of the
linkages is not strong, which is not surprising, given the
complexity of the relationships and the intangible nature
of some of the elements, as well as the research methods
which would be involved in attributing causality.
Nevertheless, there is plausibility to some of the pos-
ited relationships, especially between development of
health cadres and a strengthened public administra-
tion, which in the long run underlies a number of
state-building features, including the capacity to de-
liver services, legitimacy and provision of stability and
security. The reintegration of factional health staff
post-conflict is also plausibly linked to reconciliation
and peace-building, though clearly this has to be ac-
companied by other measures which send out comple-
mentary signals to the population. The role of medical
staff as part of national elites may also be important
and merits further study.
The paper draws from a range of literatures and illus-
trates the advantage (and perhaps also the difficulty) of
generating interdisciplinary insights. The concept of
state-building itself is highly contested, with a rich vein
of scepticism about the wisdom or feasibility of this as
an external project. While recognizing the inherently
political nature of these processes, systems and sub-
systems, it remains the case that state-building does
occur over time, driven by a combination of internal and
external forces, and that understanding the role played
in it by the health system and health staff, particularly
after conflicts and in fragile settings, is an area worth
further investigation. This review and framework aim to
contribute to that debate.
Endnotes
aPersonal communication with Joyce Smith, 2015.
bPersonal communication with Dr. Sas Karbo, MOHS
Sierra Leone, 2013.
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